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Contesting Unmodulated Deprivation: 
Sauvé v Canada and the Normative Limits of 
Punishment 
Efrat Arbel1
Despite a pressing need for judicial guidance on the legalities of administrative 
segregation, Canadian courts have yet to outline clear, comprehensive 
principles by which to assess its deployment. While some courts have rebuked 
the Correctional Service of Canada for the improper use of administrative 
segregation in specific cases, the regulation of the practice more broadly has 
proven elusive. This article turns to the Supreme Court of Canada’s prisoner 
voting rights decision in Sauvé v Canada for guidance in this regard. Since 
its release in 2002, Sauvé has been applied largely in cases involving political 
rights, and rarely in cases involving conditions of confinement. The recent 
trial level decision in Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre, however, 
suggests that Sauvé’s significance extends beyond the voting rights context. 
Building on Bacon, this article posits that Sauvé outlines a “statement of 
constitutional and carceral theory” that can be cited to scrutinize the law and 
practice of administrative segregation. It illustrates this claim by analyzing the 
Management Protocol, a corrections protocol in effect between 2003-2011 that 
authorized prison wardens to subject maximum-security women to an extreme 
solitary confinement regime. The Protocol was designed and administered in 
highly objectionable ways, revealing a clear gap between the progressive ideals 
of prisoner rights protection as articulated in Sauvé, and the record of their 
enforcement in the daily administration of corrections. Applying Sauvé to the 
Management Protocol, this article highlights the decision’s potential to critique 
and contest the improper use of administrative segregation when it results in 
unmodulated rights deprivations.
1 Assistant Professor, Peter A Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. My sincere thanks to 
Lisa Kerr for introducing me to the Management Protocol, and for her invaluable comments on earlier 
drafts of this article. Thank you also to Debra Parkes and the anonymous reviewers of the CJHR for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
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Malgré un besoin urgent d’indications jurisprudentielles en  matière d’isolement 
préventif, les tribunaux canadiens n’ont pas encore défini de principes généraux 
clairs pour évaluer son déploiement.Bien que les tribunaux aient reproché 
au Service correctionnel du Canada son usage irresponsable de l’isolement 
préventif dans certains cas  précis, la réglementation plus générale de cette 
pratique s’est avérée difficile à instaurer.Cet article examine l’affaire Sauvé c. 
Canada qui portait sur le droit de vote des prisonniers pour obtenir quelque 
indication à cet égard.Depuis sa publication en 2002, l’arrêt Sauvé est souvent 
appliqué aux causes qui concernent les droits civils et politiques, mais rarement 
à celles portant sur les conditions de détention.Cependant, Bacon c. Surrey 
Pretrial Services Centre est une décision de première instance qui suggère que 
l’importance de Sauvé dépasse le cadre des droits de vote.S’appuyant sur Bacon, 
l’auteur postule que Sauvé expose une théorie constitutionnelle et carcérale qui 
peut être utilisée pour examiner à fond  le droit et la pratique de l’isolement 
préventif. Il illustre son propos en analysant le Protocole de gestion propre au 
Service correctionnel, qui a été en vigueur entre 2003-2011 et qui autorisait 
les directeurs de prisons à assujettir les femmes des établissements à sécurité 
maximale à un régime d’isolement cellulaire extrême.Le Protocole a été conçu 
et administré de façon fortement contestable, révélant un écart flagrant entre 
les idéaux progressifs de la décision Sauvé en matière de protection des droits 
des prisonniers et l’application de ce précédent juridique dans l’administration 
quotidienne des services correctionnels.En appliquant les principes de  Sauvé 
au Protocole de gestion, l’article souligne le potentiel de cette décision pour 
l’examen du recours abusif à l’isolement préventif lorsqu’il a pour effet de priver 
des personnes de leurs droits d’une manière sauvage.
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I. Introduction
At the time of her sentencing for an assault committed while in prison, S.L.N., a First Nations woman, was twenty-eight years old. She had a chaotic and abusive upbringing, suffered from fetal alcohol 
syndrome and various forms of addiction, and was involved in the criminal 
justice system from a very young age.2 In 1999, when she was 17 years old, 
she was tried and convicted in adult court of second-degree murder, which 
she had committed at age 15, and was sentenced to life in prison.3 Between 
2000 and 2005, she was incarcerated at several federal institutions, wherein 
she committed violent offences against fellow inmates, prison officials, and 
staff.4 In 2005, after committing an assault against a staff member in Joliette 
Institute in Québec, S.L.N. was placed on the Management Protocol, an 
extreme corrections protocol implemented by the Correctional Service of 
Canada (CSC).5 
The Management Protocol authorized prison wardens to subject maximum-
security women involved in violent or disruptive incidents to a tightly regulated 
solitary confinement regime.6 The Protocol was designed and administered 
in highly objectionable ways, and used to implement extreme periods of 
unmitigated prisoner isolation far exceeding all recommended maximums, 
often lasting several years at a time. The Protocol was also disproportionately 
applied to Aboriginal women, despite stated commitments in Canadian law 
to remedy systemic disparities in the treatment of Aboriginal inmates. S.L.N., 
for example, was placed on the Management Protocol continuously between 
2005 and early 2010, and maintained on its most stringent level for more than 
two years.7 During this time, she had only minimal social interaction and next 
to no access to vital rehabilitative programming, an experience the British 
Columbia Supreme Court described as “intensely repressive and difficult” 
and “capable of inflicting great damage”.8 
The Management Protocol was introduced under the administrative 
segregation provisions in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA).9 It 
was implemented and applied without due regard for established principles 
of prisoner rights protection outlined in Canadian law. The Protocol received 
2 R v SLN, 2010 BCSC 405 at paras 15, 31 and 56, [2010] BCWLD 4535 [SLN].
3 Ibid at para 19.
4 Ibid at paras 20-29.
5 Ibid at paras 36-37.
6 Ibid at paras 41-42. Deputy Commissioner for Women, Secure Unit Operational Plan, (Ottawa: Office of the 
Deputy Commissioner for Women, 2003), online: Correctional Services Canada <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/
prgrm/fsw/secureunitop/secure-unitop-2003-eng.shtml>.
7 SLN, supra note 2 at paras 44 and 48-49.
8 Ibid at paras 42 and 63.
9 Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 2 [CCRA]. For a description of the Management Protocol 
see Deputy Commissioner for Women, supra note 6. 
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little public attention during the initial years of its operation, but gained 
increasing notoriety as a result of litigation advanced by the British Columbia 
Civil Liberties Association10 and through the work of journalists,11 prison 
activists,12 and prison scholars.13 Telling the story of the Protocol from its 
introduction in 2003 to its dissolution in 2011, Lisa Kerr makes clear that it 
amounted to a substantial revision of Canada’s solitary confinement regime, 
and resulted in serious violations of prisoner rights.14 The existence and 
implementation of the Management Protocol thus reveals a clear gap between 
the progressive ideals of prisoner rights protection as articulated in Canadian 
law, and the actual record of their enforcement in the daily administration of 
corrections.15 This lack of congruency – aptly exemplified in the case of S.L.N. 
– demonstrates that something is awry. 
In particular, although the Protocol was rescinded in May 2011,16 both the 
legislative framework and disciplinary ethos that enabled its operation remain 
in effect, and are ongoing sources of rights violations in Canadian prisons.17 
Despite a pressing need for judicial guidance on solitary confinement, 
10 In March 2011, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association filed a constitutional challenge to the 
Management Protocol under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on behalf of BobbyLee Worm, also 
seeking damages in tort. See BobbiLee Worm v Canada (AG), (Notice of Civil Claim, plaintiff) (4 March 2011), 
online: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association <bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/20110303-
BCCLA-Legal-Case-BobbyLee-Worm.pdf> [BCCLA]. The lawsuit was eventually settled out of Court in 
May 2013, see British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Worm v Canada (12 February 2013), online: 
<bccla.org/our_work/worm-v-canada/>.
11 See e.g., Marion Botsford Fraser, “Life on the Instalment Plan: Is Canada’s penal system for women making 
or breaking Renée Acoby,” The Walrus (March 2010), online: <thewalrus.ca/life-on-the-instalment-plan/>.
12 Ibid. Fraser interviews Kim Pate and Michael Jackson, who criticized and attempted to reform the 
Management Protocol throughout its tenure. The Office of the Correctional Investigator was also vocal in 
its critique of the Management Protocol, and condemned the program as counterproductive and punitive, 
not corrective. See Correctional Investigator of Canada, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator 2008-2009, (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2009) at 32, online: <www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20082009-eng.pdf> [Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2008-
2009].
13 See Lisa Kerr, “The Origins of Unlawful Prison Policies” (2015) 4:1 Can J Hum Rts 89.
14 Ibid. 
15 The “gap” between the ideals of prisoner rights protection set out in doctrine and those applied in 
practice has been well canvassed by prison scholars. See Debra Parkes, “A Prisoners’ Charter? Reflections 
on Prisoner Litigation Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2007) 40:2 UBC L Rev 629 
[Parkes, “Prisoners’ Charter?”] (reviewing nearly 25 years of Charter litigation by prisoners and arguing 
that prisoners are often treated by courts and legislatures as temporary outcasts from a meaningful form 
of rights protection).
16 The Correctional Service of Canada rescinded the Management Protocol on May 1, 2011, see Deputy 
Commissioner for Women, supra note 6. 
17 The depth and severity of these violations is captured by the story of Ashley Smith, a teenager held under 
administrative segregation in conditions of extreme deprivation for nearly four years, who died by self-
inflicted strangulation on October 19, 2007, despite guards watching her on video monitors. The Ontario 
coroner conducted an inquest into Ms. Smith’s death. On December 19, 2013, the coroner’s jury returned 
a verdict that the death was a homicide. For the verdict and recommendations, see Office of the Chief 
Coroner of Ontario, Inquest-Touching the Death of Ashley Smith: Jury Verdict and Recommendations, (Toronto: 
Queens Printer for Ontario, 2013), online: Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies <www.caefs.
ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/A.S.-Inquest-Jury-Verdict-and-Recommendations1.pdf>.
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Canadian courts have yet to outline clear, comprehensive principles by which 
to assess the legalities of its deployment.18 While some courts have rebuked 
CSC for the improper use of solitary confinement in specific cases,19 the 
regulation of the practice more broadly has proven elusive.20 
This article turns to the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision 
in Sauvé v Canada, in which the Court struck down Canada’s prisoner 
18 The need for judicial guidance on this issue was recognized by the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
in SLN, supra note 2 at paras 64-65. Noting that it was not appropriate for “this Court to wade headlong 
into such a large, complex, and specialized matter and purport to have the answer,” the Court noted the 
need for the issue “to be examined carefully” and stated its hope “that it can be moved forward effectively 
and soon.” The Court further emphasized that a “proper balance must be struck which will address 
institutional security and safety as well as the humane and supportive treatment of those persons who 
are inmates.” The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the legalities of solitary confinement in R v Olson 
(1987), 62 OR (2d) 321, 38 CCC (3d) 534 [Olson], and held that segregation “is not, per se, cruel and unusual 
treatment,” but left open the possibility that segregation could be “so excessive as to outrage the standards 
of decency.” The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this decision in R v Olson, [1989] 1 SCR 296, 47 CCC 
(3d) 491. For an interesting treatment of the anomalous character of R v Olson see Lisa Kerr, “Contesting 
Expertise in Prison Law” (2014) 60:1 McGill L J 43. The Supreme Court of Canada has also described 
solitary confinement as a “prison within a prison” in several cases. See R v Miller, [1985] 2 SCR 613 at 637, 
52 OR 585, stating, “[i]n my view there should be judicial input into the decision to confine someone to ‘a 
prison within a prison’”; Martineau v Matsqui Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 SCR 602 at 622, 50 CCC (2d) 353, 
stating, “the board’s decision had the effect of depriving an individual of his liberty by committing him to 
a ‘prison within a prison.’ In these circumstances, elementary justice requires some procedural protection. 
The rule of law must run within penitentiary walls.” Notably as well, some cases have considered limited 
constitutional rights claims relating to administrative segregation. See McArthur v Regina Correctional 
Centre, Chief Executive Officer (1990), 83 Sask R 128, 56 CCC (3d) 151 (SKQB), finding that the continued 
segregation of an inmate for his unpredictable behavior and violence towards staff members and other 
inmates did not violate the Charter’s s 12 prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment); Dégarie v 
Canada (1997), 141 FTR 142, [1997] FCJ No 947 (FCTD), finding no violation of an inmate’s constitutional 
rights due to transfer from one segregation unit to another within the same penitentiary. 
19 See Saint-Jacques v Canada (Solicitor General) (1991), 1 Admin LR (2d) 162, 45 FTR 1 (FCTD), finding CSC 
liable in damages for the tort of false imprisonment for placing an inmate in administrative segregation 
without justification; Brandon v Canada (Correctional Service) (1996), 131 DLR (4th) 761, 105 FTR 243 (FCTD), 
finding CSC liable in damages in the tort of false imprisonment for placing an inmate in segregation for 
28 days over and above his 40 day segregation order without justification; R v Hill (1997), 148 DLR (4th) 
337, 36 BCLR (3d) 211 (BCCA), finding prison officials were negligent in failure to review an inmates 
segregation order on a timely basis. See also Coumont v Canada (Correctional Services), [1994] 77 FTR 253, 
FCJ No 655 (FCTD), finding that CSC was not negligent in keeping an inmate in protective segregation; 
Caron v Canada (1999), 172 FTR 181, CarswellNat 1388 (WL Can), (affirmed 2001 FCA 173, [2001] 283 NR 
380), finding that the CSC was not negligent for placing an inmate into administrative segregation for 
refusal to participate in the institution’s rehabilitation programs. 
20 The complexities of regulating the practice are aptly captured by the Supreme Court of British Columbia’s 
decision in Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden), 2010 BCSC 805, [2010] 11 Admin LR (5th) 1 
[Bacon]. In Bacon, the Court considered whether the administrative segregation of a pre-trial detainee 
violated the Charter’s s 12 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. After a detailed review 
of the evidentiary record, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s treatment violated his s 12 Charter 
rights. The Court granted the petitioner individual relief, but did not strike down the enabling legislation, 
opting instead to “make no comment on the constitutionality of the Correction Act and the Correction Act 
Regulation” (Bacon, at para 338). Given evidence that the Act and the Regulations had been “seriously 
misinterpreted, misapplied, or ignored,” the Court reasoned that an assessment of their constitutionality 
would not be appropriate (Bacon, at para 338). The Court further emphasized that the respondent “would 
have to make a much stronger attempt to adhere to the laws that bind her before any question of the 
constitutionality of their provisions could be meaningfully addressed” (Bacon, at para 338).
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disenfranchisement laws, for guidance in this regard.21 Since its release in 
2002, Sauvé has been applied largely in the political rights context, and rarely 
in cases involving improper conditions of confinement.22 The recent trial level 
decision in Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden), however, suggests 
that Sauvé’s significance extends beyond the voting rights context.23 Building 
on Bacon, this article posits that Sauvé may be read as outlining a “statement 
of constitutional and carceral theory” that can be effectively cited to scrutinize 
the law and practice of solitary confinement. 
The article suggests that Sauvé outlines two broad normative principles. 
First, Sauvé prescribes that punishment must not be administered in an 
unmodulated manner so as to effectively treat inmates as “temporary 
outcasts” from Canadian rights protection.24 While the deprivation ushered 
by the voting ban in Sauvé differs markedly from the deprivations ushered 
by a solitary confinement order, the Court’s focus on the “unmodulated” 
nature of the rights violation offers useful guidelines by which to evaluate 
the legalities of the practice. Specifically, Sauvé may be cited to distinguish 
between segregation practices that limit Charter rights and are more likely 
to be constitutionally permissible, and segregation practices that effectively 
deny Charter rights and are more likely to attract constitutional scrutiny. 
Second, Sauvé emphasizes that corrections protocols should not be imposed 
to intensify the marginalization of Aboriginal inmates in Canadian prisons.25 
It further cautions against the social cost of implementing punishment 
policies that treat Aboriginal inmates as “unworthy outcast[s]”.26 This article 
suggests that in light of these two principles, Sauvé can and should be cited 
more frequently to scrutinize the law and practice of solitary confinement and 
condemn its use where it results in unmodulated rights deprivations like those 
imposed through the Management Protocol, and where it further exacerbates 
inequalities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal inmates. 
The article begins with an overview of the Management Protocol to 
21 Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519 [Sauvé]. For a thoughtful analysis of 
this decision, see Debra Parkes, “Prisoner Voting Rights in Canada: Rejecting the Notion of Temporary 
Outcasts” in Christopher Mele & Teresa A Miller, eds, Civil Penalties, Social Consequences (New York: 
Routledge, 2005) [Parkes, “Prisoner Voting”].  
22 Canadian courts have applied Sauvé for the principle that inmates retain their rights except those denied 
by the fact of incarceration. See Trang v Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2010 ABQB 6, [2010] 19 Alta 
LR (5th) 36, involving an application by former inmates of a remand centre under the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, allowing the claim in part, and applying Sauvé for the principle that an inmate cannot be 
“deemed to forfeit all of his civil rights” at para 943. Explaining Sauvé’s limited application, Parkes notes 
that it “cannot be ignored that the case concerned the quintessential civil and political right, the right to 
vote, rather than a right that would have implicated the prison’s quest for ‘good order’ and institutional 
security, as do many other Charter cases.” See Parkes, “Prisoners Charter”, supra note 15 at 672. 
23 Bacon, supra note 20.  
24 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 40.  
25 Ibid at paras 48-60. 
26 Ibid at para 48.
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provide context for discussion. It proceeds with a detailed analysis of the Sauvé 
decision, and demonstrates the extent to which the Protocol failed to comply 
with the Sauvé principles. The article suggests the Management Protocol 
strayed from the Sauvé principles in both its design and implementation: it did 
nothing to bring federally sentenced women within the protective umbrella of 
the Charter, and in fact defeated some of the rights protections they previously 
enjoyed. The Protocol also applied to further marginalize Aboriginal inmates, 
perpetuating the very cycle Sauvé sought to disrupt. Applying the Sauvé 
principles to the Management Protocol, the article highlights Sauvé’s potential 
to critique the improper use of solitary confinement in Canadian prisons.
II. The Management Protocol  
A. Legal Framework   
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) outlines two distinct 
types of segregation regimes: disciplinary segregation and administrative 
segregation.27 Disciplinary segregation can be imposed for serious disciplinary 
offences following a hearing before an independent decision-maker, and is 
subject to a thirty day maximum.28 Administrative segregation, in contrast, is 
not subject to such constraints and may be applied indefinitely.29 The CCRA 
empowers institutional heads to segregate inmates for various reasons, 
including a “reasonable belief” that: an inmate has acted, attempted, or intends 
to act in a manner that threatens the safety of the institution or any person 
within it; allowing an inmate to associate with others could interfere with an 
investigation; or allowing the inmate to associate with others would jeopardize 
the inmate’s safety.30 Since administrative segregation often subjects inmates 
to extreme isolation for twenty-three hours per day over lengthy periods of 
time, it is better described as solitary confinement.31 Indeed, as several critics 
27 The administrative segregation provisions are outlined in ss 31-37 of the CCRA, supra note 9. The 
disciplinary segregation provisions are outlined in ss 44 of the CCRA. For a comprehensive treatment of 
the history of segregation in Canadian law, see Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement 
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
28 CCRA, supra note 9, s 44(1)(f). See also Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620, s 40. 
29 CCRA, supra note 9, s 31(2) prescribes only that inmates are to be “released from administrative segregation 
at the earliest appropriate time” but does not delineate any specific time limits on segregation. The CCRA 
does establish minimal limits on segregation. For example, s 37 of the CCRA proclaims that an “inmate 
in administrative segregation has the same rights and conditions of confinement as other inmates, except 
for those that (a) can only be enjoyed in association with other inmates; or (b) cannot be enjoyed due to 
(i) limitations specific to the administrative segregation area; or (ii) security requirements.” In addition, 
s 4(c) of the CCRA requires the CSC to only use measures that “are limited to only what is necessary and 
proportionate to attain the purposes of this Act.”
30 CCRA, supra note 9, s 31(3).
31 See Bacon, supra note 20 at para 6 (noting that administrative segregation is “a form of solitary 
confinement”). 
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have noted, the term “administrative segregation” belies the punitive nature 
of the isolation imposed through this form of punishment.32 
While the legislative and regulatory frameworks governing administrative 
segregation provide for ongoing review, they do not establish clear limits on 
how long inmates can be held in solitary confinement, stipulating only that 
an inmate “is to be released from administrative segregation at the earliest 
appropriate time.”33 The absence of well-defined maximums permits CSC 
officials to subject inmates to isolation for indefinite periods, despite clear 
recommendations from national and international sources that solitary 
confinement must be used with restraint. The United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, for example, has stated that solitary confinement 
amounts to torture when used for more than 15 days at a time.34 In her 1996 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events at the Prison for Women in 
Kingston, Louise Arbour recommended that the CCRA be amended to ensure 
that inmates are not subject to prolonged periods of isolation, and recommended 
that “the practice of long-term confinement in administrative segregation be 
brought to an end.”35 Arbour suggested that inmates be placed in segregation 
for a maximum of 30 days at a time, and no more than 60 non-consecutive days 
in a calendar year.36 Notwithstanding these recommendations, CSC continues 
to subject inmates to prolonged bouts of isolation lasting well beyond these 
proposed maximums. Various commissions of inquiry, government reports, 
32 See Michael Jackson, Justice Behind The Walls: Human Rights In Canadian Prisons (Vancouver: Douglas 
& McIntyre, 2002) at 287 [Jackson, Justice Behind] (noting “the very term ‘administrative segregation’ 
provides apparently benign semantic camouflage for the most intensive form of punishment”). See 
Solicitor General of Canada, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston 
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1996) at 135, online: Canadian Association of 
Elizabeth Fry Societies <www.caefs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Arbour_Report.pdf> [Arbour 
Report] (stating “The segregation was administrative in name only. In fact it was punitive, and it was a 
form of punishment that courts would be loathe to impose, so destructive are its consequences”).
33 CCRA, supra note 9, s 31(2).  
34 Interim Report of The Special Rapporteur Of The United Nations Human Rights Council, UNGAOR, 66th Sess, 
UN Doc A/66/268 (2011). 
35 Arbour Report, supra note 32 at 135. In 1994, former Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour, who at the time 
was serving as a justice on the Ontario Court of Appeal, conducted an inquiry into events occurring at the 
Prison for Women in Kingston, Ontario. The Arbour Report, released in 1996, documented a culture of non-
compliance with the rule of law within the prison. It identified as particularly contentious the prolonged 
use of solitary confinement against female prisoners, and especially against female Aboriginal prisoners.
36 Ibid at 135. Despite these recommendations, according to the Office of the Correctional Investigator, 
between 2006-2011 inmates held in segregation were isolated for an average time of 40 days. See 
Correctional Investigator of Canada, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2012-2013 
(Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2013) at 29, online: Office of the Correctional Investigator 
<www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20122013-eng.aspx> (noting that Aboriginal offenders are 
over-represented in segregation placements and maximum security populations). See also Office of the 
Correctional Investigator, Segregation in Canadian Federal Corrections: A Prison Ombudsman Perspective 
(Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, March 2013), online: <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/comm/
presentations/presentations20130322-23-eng.aspx> [Correctional Investigator, Segregation] (noting that 
roughly 16.5% of segregated offenders were held in isolation for over 120 days).
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and expert investigations have criticized the CCRA for this practice.37
B. Operation and Implementation
Introduced under the administrative segregation provisions of the CCRA, 
the Management Protocol authorized prison wardens to subject women to 
an enhanced regime of solitary confinement when certain conditions were 
met.38 The Protocol applied only to women classified as “maximum-security” 
who committed acts “causing serious harm or seriously jeopardizes the safety 
of others” or who were judged to be disruptive or resistant to conventional 
punishment.39 Between 2005 and 2011, seven women were placed on the 
Protocol, most of whom were Aboriginal, a fact Howard Sapers, the Correctional 
Investigator of Canada, identified as “particularly troublesome”.40 
There were three different levels to the Protocol. Level one subjected 
women to “the highest degree of deprivation and isolation”, including 
segregation for up to twenty-three hours per day, with severe restrictions 
placed on mobility, exercise, and basic amenities.41 Levels two and three were 
heavily regulated but involved “somewhat lesser levels of isolation and the 
provision of somewhat more by way of amenities and interaction, with a view 
to reintegration or return to the general population.”42 The Protocol required 
women to “earn” their way back to less restrictive conditions through 
compliance with complex and severely onerous institutional rules. Noting the 
Protocol’s erratic and opaque application scheme, Kerr explains:
The terms of the Protocol presented a maze of demanding behavioural standards for 
women to navigate. Multiple discretionary tripwires could return a woman to lower 
levels of progress...Vague language allowed penal officials to control the process at all 
times. There were no specific or achievable criteria required for release, for example, 
two weeks without a minor or serious disciplinary offence as defined by the CCRA. 
Rather, the policy refers to “assumable risk” and “zero tolerance”, ensuring that 
37 See Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2008-2009, supra note 12 at 16 (noting that “prolonged 
periods of deprivation of human contact adversely affect mental health and are counterproductive to 
rehabilitation”); United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations: Canada, UNCATOR, 
48th Sess, UN Doc CAT/C/CAN/CO/6, (2012), at para 19 (expressing concern at Canada’s use of 
prolonged solitary confinement, and recommending that Canada “limit the use of solitary confinement 
as a measure of last resort for as short a time as possible under strict supervision and with he possibility 
of judicial review” and “abolish the use of solitary confinement for persons with serious or acute mental 
illness”). See also Correctional Services Canada Task Force on Administrative Segregation, Commitment to 
Legal Compliance, Fair Decisions and Effective Results (Ottawa: Correctional Services Canada, 1996 – 1997); 
Correctional Services Canada Working Group on Human Rights, Human Rights and Corrections: A Strategic 
Model (Ottawa: Correctional Services Canada, 1997); House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice 
and Human Rights, A Work in Progress: the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (May 2000) (Chair: Paul 
DeVillers). 
38 Deputy Commissioner for Women, supra note 6. For more details, see Kerr, supra note 13 at 98-101. 
39 Ibid, Deputy Commissioner for Women. See also SLN, supra note 2 at para 41.
40 Correctional Investigator, Annual Report, supra note 12 at 31-32.
41 SLN, supra note 2 at para 42.
42 Ibid.
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decisions would be made on a purely discretionary and ad hoc basis. Under these 
conditions, women typically had no idea what was required to graduate to the next 
Step or to be released. They had to abide by strict standards of behaviour, unusual 
even for the prison context, and particularly difficult with the mounting mental 
health effects of segregation. Even a bout of perceived depression could negatively 
affect an individual’s capacity to graduate to the next Step of the Protocol.43
Paradoxically, the Management Protocol created a system that drove 
inmates to exhibit the kind of behaviour the Protocol was designed to 
address.44 It imposed a “zero tolerance” policy for aggressive behaviour, 
and often resulted in women being isolated for lengthy periods of time and 
reprimanded for actions that would not otherwise warrant segregation if 
they were held in the general prison population.45 The Management Protocol 
thus created what the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association described 
as a “Catch-22”, whereby women placed on the Protocol were “rendered 
increasingly incapable of satisfying the Management Protocol’s zero-tolerance 
requirement given the adverse, physical, psychological and social effects of 
extended and indefinite solitary confinement.”46 While the Protocol contained 
formal checks and balances to prevent misuse or excessive application, these 
were rarely utilized.47 Instead, the Protocol was applied without much if any 
oversight, and administered in highly problematic ways, notwithstanding 
significant criticism from various stakeholders.48 In fact, the Protocol strayed 
43 Kerr, supra note 13 at 99-100.
44 See BCCLA, supra note 10 at para 18. See also Kerr, supra note 13 at 99-101. 
45 Ibid, BCCLA, at paras 12 and 18.
46 Ibid at para 18. It is well established that prolonged periods of solitary confinement can drive prisoners 
towards aggressive and anti-social behavior, including psychosis, depression, violence, and self-harm. 
For further analysis of the harmful psychological effects of solitary confinement see Stuart Grassian, 
“Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement” (2006) 22:3 JL & Pol’y 325; Craig Haney, “Mental Health 
Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’ Confinement” (2003) 49:1 Crime & Delinquency 124; Craig 
Haney & Mona Lynch, “Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and 
Solitary Confinement” (1997) 23 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 477; Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, 
“Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric, Seclusion and Solitary Confinement” (1986) 8 Int’l J L & 
Psychiatry 49.
47 Ibid, BCCLA, at para 43 (stating, “[a]s the policy is described and written, it suggests that inmates will be 
subject to this program for limited periods of time. The policy setting out the protocol also stipulates that 
there will be checks and balances and means whereby statuses can be reviewed and monitored. Whether 
this is how matters actually take place is another question”). For further discussion of the Management 
Protocol’s unlawful application see also Kerr, supra note 13. 
48 In its 2008-2009 report, for example, the Correctional Investigator condemned the Protocol as 
counterproductive and ineffective, declared it to be a “step in the wrong direction” and recommended 
that it be rescinded. See Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2008-2009, supra note 12 at 8, 16, 31, 
57, and 75. See also House of Commons, Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 39th Parl, 1st Sess, No 1 (5 June 2007) at 1125 
(Evidence given by Kim Pate, Executive Director of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies) 
online: <www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3011354&Language=E&Mo
de=1> (stating that the Protocol’s application “underscores that discriminatory and torturous treatment 
can occur and is in fact occurring as we speak in Canada”); House of Commons, Standing Committee on 
the Status of Women, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 54 (8 February 2011) at 1125 (Kim Pate, Executive Director 
of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies), online: <www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
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from the CCRA so significantly that critics have condemned it as unlawful.49
Remarkably, the Protocol was first introduced only several months after 
the Supreme Court of Canada released Sauvé v Canada. And yet, the contrast 
between the Protocol and the Sauvé decision is astounding. Sauvé remains one 
of the Court’s most progressive prisoner rights decisions. As Debra Parkes 
has argued, with the release of the Sauvé decision, the Court made clear that 
prisoners “do not hold attenuated, weaker versions of the rights enjoyed 
by other Canadians” and are “unequivocally full rights holders under the 
Charter”.50 In the analysis that follows, I analyze the Management Protocol by 
reference to Sauvé, to illuminate the gap between the principles outlined in 
Sauvé and the Protocol’s application.
III. The Sauvé Framework
A. Overview and Legal Findings
Released in 2002, Sauvé v Canada involved a constitutional challenge to 
section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, which disenfranchised prisoners 
serving a sentence of two years or more.51 Richard Sauvé, serving a life sentence 
for first-degree murder, advanced the challenge under section 3 of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees “every citizen of Canada… the right 
to vote”.52 He was joined by a group of Aboriginal plaintiffs who argued 
that prisoner disenfranchisement violated both their section 3 voting rights 
and their section 15 equality rights due to the marked overrepresentation of 
Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=4938193&File=0> (stating that for women placed under 
the management protocol, prison “is becoming the greatest risk factor for those women and for public 
safety”). In a letter dated March 2011 to then Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews, a coalition comprised of 
prominent Canadian rights groups condemned the Protocol’s discriminatory application and noted “its 
methods constitute cruel and unusual punishment,” see Letter from the Canadian Association of Elizabeth 
Fry Societies et al to the Honourable Vic Toews (31 March 2011), online: <www.caefs.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/2011-BCCLA-Letter-Toews-Solitary-Confinement.pdf>. In addition, as Kerr explains, 
the Protocol was also subject to internal critique from CSC, which she suggests “reveals an increasing 
appreciation of the dysfunctions of the Management Protocol, while still marking a clear resistance to 
moving away from the main features of the program,” see Kerr, supra note 13 at 107.
49 See generally Kerr, supra note 13.
50 Parkes, “Prisoner Voting”, supra note 21 at 243 and 246.
51 Canada Elections Act, RSC 1985, c E-2.
52 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 3 [Charter]. Prior to 1993, s 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, RSC 
1985, c E-2 barred “every person undergoing punishment as an inmate in any penal institution for the 
commission of any offence” from voting in provincial and federal elections (Parkes, “Prisoner Voting”, 
supra note 21). In Sauvé v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 438, 153 NR 242, the Supreme Court of 
Canada affirmed an earlier ruling made by the Ontario Court of Appeal which struck down the wholesale 
prohibition on prisoner voting rights as unconstitutional. In response, the federal government enacted 
s 51(3) of the Canada Elections Act, which disenfranchised only dangerous offenders serving prolonged 
sentences of 2 years or more. The revised provision disqualified “every person who is imprisoned in a 
correctional institution serving a sentence of two years or more,” cited in Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 2.
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Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons.53 
The governing framework for interpreting Charter claims prescribes 
that once a claimant establishes that a Charter rights violation has taken 
place, the burden shifts to the government to prove that this violation can 
be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” under section 1 
of the Charter.54 The two-stage process recognizes that certain Charter rights 
may be subject to lawful limitation where such limitation is constitutionally 
justified. In this case, since the government conceded that the voting ban 
violated the plaintiffs’ section 3 voting rights, the decision centered on the 
section 1 analysis.55 The government made four arguments in support of 
the voting ban, arguing that prisoner disenfranchisement: (1) enhanced the 
general purposes of criminal sanction and promoted civic responsibility, (2) 
enhanced respect for the rule of law, (3) could be justified by reference to social 
contract theory, and, (4) was an appropriate moral and punitive response to 
the commission of serious offences.56 
By a narrow margin of five to four, the Supreme Court of Canada declared 
section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional.57 Rejecting all four 
of the government’s arguments, the majority held that the government 
“had failed to identify particular problems that require denying the right 
to vote.”58 It held that objectives like enhancing punishment and promoting 
civic responsibility could be raised in support of any law, and were too 
vague to justify overriding a constitutionally protected right. Dismissing the 
government’s claims as “abstract” and “symbolic”, the majority held that the 
government did not satisfy the “vigorous justification analysis required by the 
Charter.”59 If Parliament “can infringe a crucial right such as the right to vote 
simply by offering symbolic and abstract reasons,” the majority explained, 
“judicial review either becomes vacuously constrained or reduced to a contest 
of ‘our symbols are better than your symbols’.”60 
53 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 5.
54 Charter, supra note 52, s 1. 
55 The s 1 test is outlined in R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 24 CCC (3d) 321, as supplemented by subsequent case 
law, prescribes that a violating law will only be upheld under s 1 if it relates to a pressing and substantial 
legislative objective that warrants overriding a constitutionally protected right, and if the means chosen 
for its implementation are reasonable, proportionate, and impair the right as minimally as possible. The 
core point of disagreement between the majority and dissent revolved around the degree of deference 
owed to the legislature under the s 1 analysis. For further discussion, see Christopher P Manfredi, “The 
Day the Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauvé v Canada” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 105.
56 Sauvé, supra note 21 at paras 21-22. 
57 Ibid. The majority opinion, authored by McLachlin CJC, struck down the law on grounds that it 
contravened the right to vote guaranteed by s 3 of the Charter in ways that could not be ‘saved’ by s 1, at 
paras 1-62. The dissenting opinion, authored by Gonthier J, held that while the voting ban violated the 
plaintiffs’ s 3 rights, it could be upheld under s 1 of the Charter. The dissent further held that the voting 
ban did not violate the plaintiffs’ equality rights, at paras 189-206.
58 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 26.
59 Ibid at paras 22-23. 
60 Ibid at para 23.
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The majority drew specific conclusions with respect to each of the 
government’s claims. First, it held there was no evidence that prisoner 
disenfranchisement enhanced criminal sanction or promoted civic 
responsibility.61 Rather, the majority reasoned that disenfranchisement was 
more likely to communicate the “unacceptable message” that prisoners – or 
to use the Court’s words, “citizen law breakers” – were less valued members 
of the community.62 Second, the majority held that disenfranchisement 
did not promote respect for the rule of law, but rather undermined it by 
communicating the harmful message that while everyone is bound to obey 
the law, not everyone can participate in its making. Denying any subsection 
of the Canadian public the right to vote would weaken the government’s 
claim to representative democracy, and thus erode the very basis of its right to 
punish law-breakers.63 As the majority explained, both the right of the state to 
impose punishment and the obligation of the prisoner to accept punishment 
“are tied to society’s acceptance of the criminal as a person with rights and 
responsibilities.”64 
The majority made a similar point in dismissing the government’s third 
argument. It reasoned that social contract theory establishes a “vital symbolic, 
theoretical and practical connection between having a voice in making the law 
and being obliged to obey it”,65 which was not only “enshrined in the Charter” 
but also stood “at the heart of our system of constitutional democracy.”66 While 
the social contract requires citizens to obey the law, failure to do so does not 
nullify the citizen’s “continued membership in the self-governing polity”.67 
To deny prisoners the right to vote would be to fail to grasp the essence of 
these principles as embodied in the Charter.68 Finally, the majority rejected the 
government’s claim that disenfranchisement was a legitimate form of moral 
punishment. Emphasizing that prisoners are full and valued members of the 
Canadian constitutional polity, the majority cautioned that such symbolic 
punishment “countermands the message that everyone is equally worthy and 
entitled to respect under the law – that everybody counts.”69 Thus, finding 
that disenfranchisement per section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act served no 
legitimate penal purpose and could not be justified by reference to any valid 
overriding policy objective, the majority struck down the voting ban, and held 
that prisoner disenfranchisement was not a constitutionally permissible form 
61 Ibid at para 38. 
62 Ibid at para 40. 
63 Ibid at para 34. 
64 Ibid at para 47.
65 Ibid at para 31.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid at para 47.
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at para 58.
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of punishment.70
B. Normative Principles 
As Parkes explains, because the government advanced what can only 
be described as normative arguments in support of its position, the Court in 
Sauvé “subjected the normative arguments for prisoner disenfranchisement 
to close scrutiny.”71 Quite apart from the majority’s statements on the rule of 
law or the mechanics and morality of disenfranchisement, Sauvé also outlined 
broad normative parameters for what permissible punishment should look 
like in a constitutional polity committed to prisoner rights protection. These 
principles have application beyond the context of this case. Indeed, as the 
recent trial level decision in Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden) 
suggests, Sauvé outlines a “statement of constitutional and carceral theory” 
that is applicable outside the voting rights context.72 
As briefly noted above, Sauvé outlines two broad normative principles. 
First, it suggests punishment will not be constitutionally permissible if it 
treats prisoners as “temporary outcasts” from Canadian rights protection.73 
According to Sauvé, punishment that temporarily exempts prisoners from 
constitutionally protected rights has “no place in a democracy built upon 
principles of inclusiveness, equality and citizen participation.”74 While Sauvé 
recognizes that limiting certain Charter rights through incarceration is both 
justifiable and necessary, it is also clear that inmates retain their residual Charter 
rights while incarcerated. Indeed, the principle that convicted felons are sent 
to prison as punishment not for punishment runs throughout the majority’s 
analysis in Sauvé, reflecting the core ideas emphasized by Correctional Law 
Review Working Group, a group tasked with revising the CCRA to ensure 
constitutional compliance after the Charter came into force. The Working 
Group’s operational statement establishes the “retained rights” principles as 
a cornerstone of its correctional philosophy, and states that “inmates retain all 
of the rights of a member of society, except those that are necessarily removed 
or restricted by the fact of incarceration.”75 
The majority further held that punishment will only be permissible if it 
is not imposed arbitrarily, serves a legitimate penal purpose, and is applied 
70 Ibid at paras 49-51. 
71 Parkes, “Prisoners’ Charter?”, supra note 15 at 242.
72 Bacon, supra note 20 at para 315. 
73 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 40. 
74 Ibid at para 41.
75 The Working Group’s recommendations further make clear that inmates should be entitled to Charter 
rights while in prison, and that the “the only justifiable limitations [on inmate rights] are those that are 
necessary to achieve a legitimate correction goal, and that are the least restrictive possible.” See Criminal 
Law Review Working Paper No 5, at 5-6, cited in Jackson, Justice Behind, supra note 32 at 64. 
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in ways that bring inmates within the “protective umbrella of the Charter”.76 
It held that while “Parliament may limit constitutional rights in the name of 
punishment” it cannot simply decide that a “particular class of people for 
a particular period of time will completely lose a particular constitutional 
right.”77 The Court explained that subjecting inmates to such “unmodulated 
deprivation” would be “tantamount to saying that the affected class is outside 
the full protection of the Charter.”78 
This principle is helpful in assessing the legalities of solitary confinement, 
and in scrutinizing the Management Protocol. The Court’s statements 
that unmodulated deprivations effectively remove inmates from Charter 
protection are instructive, and direct the focus of analysis to the nature of the 
deprivation at hand. This approach is consistent with the courts’ assessments 
of solitary confinement to date. In R v Olson, for example, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal ruled that solitary confinement “is not, per se, cruel and unusual 
treatment”, but also indicated that the legalities of the practice will hinge 
on whether it is “so excessive as to outrage the standards of decency”.79 In 
Bacon, the British Columbia Supreme Court similarly held that “whether or 
not solitary confinement, in itself, is cruel and unusual punishment depends 
on what ‘compensating efforts are made by the correctional authorities’.”80 
The Court reasoned that, “long periods of solitary confinement without 
mitigating or compensating efforts by correctional authorities may qualify as 
‘cruel and unusual’ treatment” and further emphasized that where additional 
deprivations are imposed, the treatment amounts to “cruelty by any 
measure”.81 In light of these statements, Sauvé’s focus on the unmodulated 
nature of the deprivation can be cited to distinguish between segregation 
practices that limit Charter rights and segregation practices that usher their 
effective denial.
By subjecting prisoners to extreme isolation orders resulting in effective 
denials of prisoner rights, the Management Protocol marshaled a form of 
punishment to the unmodulated deprivations deemed unconstitutional in 
Sauvé. Inmates placed on the Protocol were forced to endure conditions of 
unmitigated deprivation. S.L.N., for example, was placed on the Protocol 
between 2005 and early 2010, and maintained at its most stringent stage for 
more than two years.82 During this time, she was isolated for twenty-three 
hours a day, had limited access to medical and psychiatric treatment, was 
unable to move within the prison without three guards in attendance and the 
76 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 37.
77 Ibid at para 46.
78 Ibid.
79 Olson, supra note 18.
80 Bacon, supra note 20 at para 317.
81 Ibid at para 316.
82 SLN, supra note 2 at para 44. 
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use of handcuffs and shackles, and disallowed from participating in the very 
programs designed to encourage her rehabilitation.83 The British Columbia 
Supreme Court recognized that this extreme deprivation did little to advance 
S.L.N’s rehabilitation, and cautioned that the Protocol is “entirely capable of 
inflicting great damage on those to whom it is applied.”84 
BobbyLee Worm, another First Nations woman, was kept on the 
Management Protocol for almost four years, and held in conditions of extreme 
isolation with minimal access to rehabilitative services, medical treatment, 
or Aboriginal programming.85 As a result of her time on the Management 
Protocol, Ms. Worm showed “significant signs of psychological deterioration 
attributable to being segregated for an extended period of time.”86 
Renée Acoby, another First Nations woman, was placed on the 
Management Protocol from its introduction in 2003 until its cancellation in 
2011. She was also subject to unmitigated isolation, and oppressive conditions 
of confinement. Describing the punitive conditions imposed on Acoby during 
her time on the Protocol, journalist Marion Botsford Fraser writes:
Some aspects of the daily reality of the Protocol seem absurd, picayune. According to 
Acoby, she has in the past had to earn her way to more than ten squares of toilet paper, 
and has been required to clean her cell with a face cloth and hand soap until she 
earned the privilege of a mop, a broom, and real cleaning fluids. For several months 
at a time, she says, meals were brought to her cell in paper cones, “like Dixie cups.” 
She has been prohibited from brushing her teeth more than once a day. And she has 
been told that she must not use profane language for thirty days. (Her response was 
to swear a blue streak for several days, until the condition was withdrawn.)87
In addition to this routine humiliation, Acoby was also never informed of 
how long she would spend on the Management Protocol, and thus forced 
to contend with, what Michael Jackson describes as, the “ultimate horror”.88 
Jackson explains: 
People cannot tolerate a situation in which there seems to be no escape... If Acoby 
feels there is no escape and, knowing her own limitations, fears she cannot put 
together a month or two of good behaviour without some infraction that sends her 
back to the previous phase, then she is in a situation where there is inescapable pain 
and inescapable punishment.89
The nature and severity of the punishment imposed by the Management 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid at para 63.
85 BCCLA, supra note 10.
86 Ibid at para 22.
87 Fraser, supra note 11. 
88 Ibid (interviewing law professor Michael Jackson about Ms Acoby’s time on the Protocol).
89 See also Arbour Report, supra note 32 at 103 (stating, “prolonged segregation is a devastating experience, 
particularly when its duration is unknown at the outset and when the inmate feels that she has little 
control over it”).
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Protocol was fundamentally unmodulated. The Protocol did not comply with 
the retained rights principle, and temporarily outcast the women placed upon 
it from the sphere of constitutional protection contrary to the principles set 
out in Sauvé.
The second normative principle outlined in Sauvé provides that punishment 
should not be imposed to further marginalize Aboriginal inmates. The majority 
makes clear that policies that perpetuate the marginalization of disadvantaged 
populations cannot be tolerated in a corrections system that values the inherent 
worth and value of every individual. These statements may similarly be read 
for their normative value, and help illuminate the problem of Aboriginal over 
incarceration outside the context of sentencing.90 Sauvé warns against “the 
cost of silencing the voices of incarcerated Aboriginal peoples” since doing 
so would send the wrong message that Aboriginal peoples are less valued 
in Canadian society.91 It further cautions against implementing punishment 
protocols that communicate to “an Aboriginal person suffering from social 
displacement” that he or she is “an unworthy outcast” and prescribes that 
90 See R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 133 CCC (3d) 385 (identifying the overrepresentation of Aboriginal 
people in Canadian prisons as a “crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system” and outlining a 
framework through which to address this problem); R v Ipeelee, 2013 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433 (clarifying 
the application of the Gladue framework). Despite attempts to address Aboriginal over-incarceration, 
the problem persists. In a report released in 2012, the Office of the Correctional Investigator reported 
that while Aboriginal peoples comprise roughly 3.8% of the Canadian population, roughly 23.2% of the 
total inmate population serving federal sentences is of Aboriginal descent. That same report documented 
a 37.3% increase in the incarcerated Aboriginal population over the last decade. The report further 
concluded that the disparity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders “continues to widen on 
nearly every indicator of correctional performance,” given that Aboriginal peoples are more likely to 
be classified as high risk, are over-represented in maximum security institutions and under-represented 
in community supervision populations, serve disproportionately more of their sentence behind bars 
before first release, are more likely to return to prison on revocation of parole, and are disproportionately 
involved in institutional security incidents, use of force interventions, segregation and self-injurious 
behaviour. As the Report further indicates, Aboriginal women are consistently overrepresented in Federal 
prisons as compared with Aboriginal men. For example, between 2001-2002 and 2011-2012, the federally 
incarcerated Aboriginal women population increased by 85.7%. See Canada, Correctional Investigator 
of Canada, Spirit Matters: Aboriginal People and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, Final Report 
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2012), online: <www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/
pdf/oth-aut/oth-aut20121022-eng.pdf> [Correctional Investigator, Spirit Matters]. See also Public Safety 
Canada, Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview: Annual Report 2011 (Ottawa: Public Safety 
Canada, 2011). As numerous critics have argued, this staggering rise in incarceration rates speaks of 
only one dimension of discrimination experienced by federally incarcerated Aboriginal women. See 
Patricia Monture-Angus, “Considering Colonialism and Oppression: Aboriginal Women, Justice and 
the ‘Theory’ of Decolonization” (1999) 12 Native Studies Review 63; Kim Anderson, A Recognition of 
Being: Reconstructing Native Womanhood (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2000); Mary Ellen Turpel, “Patriarchy 
and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First Nations Women” (1993) 6 CJWL 174. For an 
analysis of the intersections between Aboriginal women’s experience as gendered and racialized subjects, 
see Patricia Monture-Angus, “Aboriginal Women and the Application of the Charter” in Thunder in My 
Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995) at 131-51.
91 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 48 and 60. The Court’s statements gain particular significance when viewed 
against the history of Aboriginal disenfranchisement in Canadian law, and the fact that Aboriginal peoples 
were denied the right to vote until 1960 specifically because they were regarded as less valued members 
of Canadian society. See Canadian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights in Canada: A Historical 
Perspective, online: <www.chrc-ccdp.ca/en/browseSubjects/votingRights.asp>. 
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corrections policies should be applied to recognize and attend to the fact that 
“Aboriginal peoples in prison have unique perspectives and needs.”92  
As noted above, the Protocol was disproportionately applied against 
Aboriginal women, which is perhaps not surprising given that Aboriginal 
women are disproportionately classified as maximum-security offenders.93 
Critics have long pointed to core problems with the Custody Rating Scale 
used to classify a prisoner’s security level.94 Studies suggest that the Custody 
Rating Scale classification scheme often labels non-violent Aboriginal women 
as requiring maximum-security incarceration because of factors like substance 
abuse, a history of family violence, or mental incapacity or imbalance, all 
of which elevate risk classification.95 For example, in a study assessing the 
underlying assumptions and existing practices of classification and assessment 
in federal women’s prisons, Kelley Hannah-Moffat and Margaret Shaw 
conclude that the risk-based classification scheme fails to adequately consider 
minority ethno-cultural and female populations.96 Indeed, the Custody 
Rating Scale has proven ill equipped to address the specific circumstances of 
Aboriginal women.97 As Allison Campbell notes, the “very structure of the 
security classification system causes Aboriginal women to receive a higher 
score on the [Custody Rating Scale], although it likely has little to do with 
92 Sauvé, supra note 21 at para 48 and 60. 
93 See Correctional Investigator, Spirit Matters, supra note 90 at para xiii. See also Aboriginal Corrections 
Policy Unit, Public Safety Canada, Marginalized: the Aboriginal Women’s Experience in Federal Corrections 
by Mandy Wesley (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2012) at 33, online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/
pblctns/mrgnlzd/mrgnlzd-eng.pdf> (indicating that Aboriginal women tend to be segregated more 
frequently and for longer periods of time than non-Aboriginal women); Canadian Association of Elizabeth 
Fry Societies, 10th Anniversary of the Arbour Commission Report (2006) at 3, online: <www.caefs.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/10th-Anniversary-of-the-Arbour-Commission-Report.pdf> (pointing to the 
“over-representation of Aboriginal women in maximum security” and stating that as of 2006, although 
Aboriginal women accounted for only 3% of the female population of Canada, accounted for 46% of the 
women classified as maximum security).
94 See Commissioner’s Directives 505, Security Classification of Inmates, cited in Allison Campbell, Federally 
Sentenced Women and Security Classification (2006) at 2, online: Prison Justice <www.prisonjustice.ca/
politics/security_classification.pdf>. For an interesting analysis of the “conceptual gridlock” underpinning 
the debate about gender and risk assessment classification, see e.g. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, “Gridlock or 
Mutability: Reconsidering ‘Gender’ and Risk Assessment” (2009) 8:1 Criminology and Public Policy 209.
95 See Arbour Report, supra note 32. See also Native Women’s Association of Canada, Federally Sentenced 
Aboriginal Women Offenders: An Issue Paper (June 2007), online: Labrador and Aboriginal Affairs Office 
<www.laa.gov.nl.ca/laa/naws/pdf/nwac-federally.pdf>.
96 Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Margaret Shaw, Taking Risks: Incorporating Gender and Culture into the Classification 
and Assessment of Federally Sentenced Women in Canada (March 2011) at vii, online: Government of Canada 
<www.publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/SW21-66-2001E.pdf>.
97 The problems with the Custody Rating Scale persist notwithstanding that the Scale is designed to be gender 
responsive. For a critique of gender responsive penal policies, see Kelly Hannah-Moffat, “Sacrosanct or 
Flawed: Risk, Accountability and Gender-Responsive Penal Politics” (2010) 22:2 Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice 193 (arguing inter alia that gender responsive penality is “situated within a narrow politics of 
difference that posits an essentialist characterization of women as relational, thereby resurrecting past 
debates about the politics of difference”). See also Joane Martel, “Women in the ‘hole’: The Unquestioned 
Practice of Segregation” in Kelly Hannah-Moffatt & Margaret Shaw, eds, An Ideal Prison? Critical Essays 
on Women’s Imprisonment in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2000) 130 (analyzing the gendered 
impact of solitary confinement).
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their risk to society.”98 Calling the integrity of this classification scheme into 
question, Campbell argues:
The simple fact that over one-third of women classified as maximum-security 
are Aboriginal calls into question the basis and assumptions on which the CSC’s 
perception of risk is evaluated… Aboriginal women and men come into conflict with 
the law already distrustful of a system that in many ways was put in place to continue 
to colonize and oppress them. They come to this system already well versed in how 
to subvert it, to resist it, to challenge its authority over their lives. Aboriginal women 
in the criminal justice system are more likely to be classified as maximum security 
because of the violence they experience outside the prison walls, and because of their 
resistance strategies inside them.99
As Campbell concludes, because of its failure to consider criteria relevant 
to the specific circumstances of female Aboriginal offenders, the security 
classification system often yields skewed assessments that further marginalize 
Aboriginal women in Canadian prisons.100 
The Management Protocol was applied based on criteria that have long 
been recognized as disadvantageous to Aboriginal women, and without 
sufficient regard for their specific circumstances and needs. Since women 
placed on the Protocol were also largely denied the opportunity to partake 
in Aboriginal programming, the Protocol only compounded and further 
exacerbated existing disparities in the Canadian criminal justice system. It 
is here that the incongruence between the core principles outlined in Sauvé 
and the Management Protocol’s application becomes most clearly visible. By 
subjecting Aboriginal inmates to extreme bouts of deprivation and isolation 
for years at a time, and restricting their access to ordinary group-based 
rehabilitative programs and Aboriginal programming, the Protocol sent a 
clear message to inmates like S.L.N., BobbyLee Worm and Renée Acoby that 
they were temporarily cast out from Canadian rights protection. 
The stories of the women placed on the Management Protocol reveal that 
the Protocol did nothing to bring inmates within the protective umbrella of 
the Charter, and in fact ousted some that previously had access to Charter 
protection. The punishment marshaled by the Protocol was unmitigated and 
punitive, and resulted in the effective denial of Charter rights. The Protocol 
was also applied without due regard to the unique needs of the Aboriginal 
women placed upon it. To this extent, the Management Protocol bears a 
strong resemblance to the unmodulated forms of deprivation placed outside 
the scope of constitutional legitimacy by Sauvé.
98 Campbell, supra note 94 at 6.
99 Ibid at 5. 
100 Ibid. See also Canadian Human Rights Commission, Protecting Their Rights: A Systemic Review of Human 
Rights in Correctional Services for Federally Sentenced Women (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
2003), online: <www.chrc-ccdp.ca/sites/default/files/fswen.pdf> (analyzing the treatment of federally 
sentenced women, and urging for a move away from a “one-size-fits-all” approach to corrections).
140 n Canadian Journal of Human Rights  (2015) 4:1 Can J Hum Rts
That the Management Protocol was implemented so soon after the release 
of the Sauvé decision, and in apparent non-compliance with its terms, points to 
a troubling gap between the progressive stance on prisoner rights outlined in 
this decision, and the subordination of these rights in the daily administration 
of corrections. This gap can be attributed to a range of factors, for example, 
limited legal aid funding for prison litigation,101 ineffective accountability and 
oversight,102 or a tendency among Canadian courts to renege responsibility 
to monitor prisoner rights and defer instead to prison officials.103 To date, 
Sauvé’s potential in bridging this gap and addressing core problems with 
the law and practice of administrative segregation has not been effectively 
realized, despite a pressing need for judicial guidance in this regard. The core 
principles outlined in Sauvé – that punishment must not be applied in an 
unmodulated manner to exclude inmates from rights protection or to further 
marginalize Aboriginal offenders – have clear application outside the voting 
rights context. These principles may be read as foundational to the broader 
“statement of constitutional and carceral theory” outlined in this decision, and 
cited to scrutinize the undmodulated implementation of solitary confinement 
regimens like those imposed through the Management Protocol.
IV. Conclusion
In the wake of sweeping reforms which are scaling back protections for 
prisoners in Canada, the gap between Sauvé’s progressive stance on prisoner 
rights protection and the record of their enforcement has widened. The use of 
solitary confinement is growing, with reports of more than 8,700 admissions 
101 For an analysis of legal aid barriers in federal settings see Department of Justice Canada, Study of the Legal 
Services Provided to Penitentiary Inmates by Legal Aid Plans and Clinics in Canada (Ottawa: Department of 
Justice Canada, Research and Statistics Division, 2002), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/
ccs-ajc/rr03_la10-rr03_aj10/rr03_la10.pdf> (documenting difficulties prisoners experience in accessing 
legal services, and examining approaches for addressing these difficulties). See also Debra Parkes et 
al, “Listening to their Voices: Women Prisoners and Access to Justice in Manitoba” (2009) 26 Windsor 
Yearbook of Access to Justice 85 (analyzing how limited legal aid funding creates access to justice barriers 
in provincial settings).
102 For discussion of these barriers see Debra Parkes & Kim Pate, “Time for Accountability: Effective Oversight 
of Women’s Prisons” (2006) 48 Can J Crim & Crim Jus 251; Ivan Zinger, “Human Rights Compliance 
and the Role of External Prison Oversight” (2006) 48 Can J Crim & Crim Jus 127. For an analysis of the 
history of independent adjudication in the context of administrative segregation see Michael Jackson, 
“The Litmus Test of Legitimacy: Independent Adjudication and Administrative Segregation” (2006) 48 
Can J Crim & Crim Jus 157.
103 For an example of this tendency see R v Shubley, [1990] 1 SCR 3, 52 CCC (3d) 481. See also Parkes, 
“Prisoners’ Charter?”, supra note 15 at 658 (stating that “the Shubley majority shows a substantial degree of 
deference to the Ontario government’s characterization of the internal discipline process”); Allan Manson, 
“Solitary Confinement, Remission and Prison Discipline” (1990) 75 Crim Rep (3d) 356 at 357 (stating that 
the majority’s decision “not to inquire more carefully into the factors of imprisonment does not do justice 
to the expanded function of the judiciary in the post-Charter era”); Kerr, supra note 18 (describing patterns 
of judicial deference to prison administrators in Canada and suggesting that penal law has been slow to 
adapt to modes of legal analysis established under the Charter). 
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to segregation cells in federal penitentiaries in 2012, an increase of about 700 
inmates in a five-year period.104 These figures are especially alarming given that 
Aboriginal inmates are disproportionately subjected to solitary confinement, 
and account for roughly 31% of all segregation cases.105 In the midst of this 
regression, it is important to take heed of Louise Arbour’s resounding call to 
“resist the temptation to trivialize the infringement of prisoners’ rights as either 
an insignificant infringement of rights, or as an infringement of the rights of 
people who do not deserve any better.”106 As Arbour reminds, “[w]hen a right 
has been granted by law, it is no less important that such right be respected 
because the person entitled to it is a prisoner.”107 Resisting the temptation to 
trivialize the infringement of prisoner rights is a necessary step to ensure Charter 
compliance in corrections policy. When the legalities of solitary confinement 
practices next come before the courts, a more robust integration of Sauvé’s 
normative principles can serve a useful tool in ensuring the Charter’s protective 
reach more effectively permeates the prison walls. 
104 Correctional Investigator, Segregation, supra note 36. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Arbour Report, supra note 32 at 101.
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